Monitor need not investigate every claim, Ontario court rules

How do you prove a proprietary claim in an insolvency proceeding?

In Re Hudson's Bay Company, 2026 ONSC 4305
How do you prove a proprietary claim in an insolvency proceeding?

Summary: The Ontario Superior Court has dismissed a claimant’s attempt to assert proprietary rights over Hudson’s Bay Company assets based on alleged ancestral land interests dating back to the Red River Settlement, holding that claimants in CCAA proceedings bear the burden of proving an interest in debtor property and cannot require a monitor to investigate and disprove unsupported historical claims. Justice Kimmel found that claimant Robert Rene Turpin’s archival materials showed, at most, employment and historical connections between members of the Turpin family and HBC, but did not establish ownership of land, the 1670 Royal Charter or any other HBC asset. The Court therefore rejected Turpin’s $30 million restitution claim, his requests to halt distributions under hardship programs and stay the auction of HBC assets, and his proposed $360 million stewardship and licensing framework for the Charter. Justice Kimmel also stressed the importance of finality in CCAA proceedings, noting that the Charter had already been sold through a Court-approved transaction, donated to public institutions and the sale proceeds distributed, while the hardship program had already been approved and implemented. The decision confirms that monitors have no general duty to investigate every assertion made against an insolvent estate and that stakeholders are entitled to rely on final, unappealed CCAA orders..

The moving party, Turpin, sought a declaration that he had a proprietary interest in the HBC Charter and various HBC artefacts (the “Proprietary Claims”), which, according to him, took precedence over any gift or sale of those assets to third parties by the Applicants (as occurred during or prior to the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act proceedings). He sought an order staying the auction of the HBC artefacts. The Proprietary Claims were described as “unextinguished land assets” in the Red River Settlement (modern day Winnipeg) that he asserted could be traced back through a 10-generation lineage to his ancestors.

Turpin argued that he had substantiated his Proprietary Claims on the basis of a reverse onus, whereby the Monitor was obligated to conduct a further investigation to either (i) disprove his Proprietary Claims by producing what he described as a superior deed before the transfer of certain lands and assets by HBC to the Province of Manitoba in 1994, or (ii) verify his Proprietary Claims. There was no statutory or precedential support for Turpin’s attempt to shift the onus of “disproof” or a duty to investigate the questions that he claimed were raised by the archival records onto the Monitor.

The Court found that the referenced historical and archival records did not establish that Turpin’s ancestors owned any land or other property that became part of the property of HBC. Further, even if the Turpin lineage settlement activity and land occupancy had been proven, that would not give the Turpin descendants the “unextinguished land entitlement” said to form the basis for his Proprietary Claims in the assets of the HBC estate. The Court referenced the Monitor’s reporting that the archival records Turpin relied upon at most document an employment relationship between individuals Turpin claimed were his ancestors and HBC. The records did not disclose a proprietary interest in favour of any person in any HBC asset.

Turpin essentially sought to have the Applicants prove their lawful chain of title to all lands and other property, not based on current legal documents that showed the Applicants as the owners at the time of the insolvency filing, but based on a chain of title that the Applicants had to establish starting back in the mid-17th century and carrying forward. To adopt that approach would turn modern property law and insolvency and restructuring law on its head. Property owners, debtors, the court officers appointed to administer the debtors’ estate. and their creditors are entitled to rely on title documents, public registries of title and other legal documents evidencing the current ownership of the property of a debtor/vendor.

If someone claims to have an interest in the debtor’s property, the onus is on them to put forward evidence to prove their claim, not just to raise questions for further investigation. A court officer such as the Monitor will take information received from stakeholders into consideration in its overall assessment and reporting on the state of affairs of the Applicant companies in a CCAA proceeding, insofar as that might affect the ability of the Applicants to deal with their property and/or upon the Monitor’s recommendations to the court in the context of the CCAA administration. However, there is no duty, fiduciary or otherwise, to investigate and effectively disprove every assertion made concerning the assets of the companies under the Monitor’s administration. The onus of proving those assertions is on the claimant making them.

The Proprietary Claims were not proven on a balance of probabilities or otherwise. The Court concluded that, despite Turpin’s criticisms of the Monitor, the Monitor had treated Turpin and his various requests reasonably and fairly, and the Monitor had conducted itself in a manner consistent with the objectives of the CCAA and its restructuring purpose in its dealings with Turpin and his claims.

Turpin’s request for a stay of the auction of the HBC assets was predicated on the same failed predicate that the status quo should be preserved pending further investigation and the determination of the unresolved archival and historical issues raised in the CCAA proceedings. The auction included the sale of the Charter that was approved by the court in December 2025. Turpin did not object to the process pursuant to which the Charter was marketed (as part of the court-approved auction process). The Monitor only began to receive correspondence from Turpin in January 2026, after the Charter Transaction had closed and the proceeds therefrom were distributed. It would be highly inappropriate and prejudicial to the CCAA proceedings, and all parties involved, to suggest the Charter marketing process and Charter Transaction could be revisited.

The Court dismissed Turpin’s motion and denied all relief sought in connection with the motion.

Judge: The Honourable Justice Michael Lema

Professionals involved:

  • Ashley Taylor and Chloe Duggal of Stikeman Elliott for HBC

  • Sean Zweig, Michael Shakra and Thomas Gray of Bennett Jones for Alvarez & Marsal as Monitor